- Russian Dam Disaster: Assessing the Cost of Failed Safety Practices
- Analyzing the Human Element of the Russia Dam Disaster
- Turbine 2: How a Track Record of Uncertainty Led to Disaster
- Russian Dam Disaster: A Reckoning for Bypassed Safety
- When Running People Past Their Breaking Point Effects Safety: The Bayer Crop Science Incid…
INCIDENT
The Hydroelectric Power Station Had Troubling Past
Had the operators reviewed the history of that particular turbine unit (Turbine 2) prior to authorizing the firing up of the turbine, they certainly would have pursued a different plan of attack. However, in this instance, caution gave way to an impulsive decision under duress to bring the flawed turbine back into service.
That fateful decision led to disaster. On August 17, 2009, at 8:13 a.m., the Sayano–Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station in Khakassia, Russia, suffered the catastrophic event of Turbine 2 breaking violently apart. Within minutes of the accident, 75 people were dead and 40 more injured. The turbine and engine rooms were flooded, and a collapsed ceiling left 9 of 10 turbines damaged or destroyed.
Best practices for avoiding common cause failure and preventing cyber security
attacks in Safety Systems
attacks in Safety Systems
Learn how safety system designers are choosing the level of integration appropriate for the specific application and control philosophy.
While Layers of Protection should remain functionally independent from each other, it’s also important streamline the management of process safety.
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